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THE LOGIC OF RELIGION—CONCLUDED

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I have defined religion as *a social attitude toward the non-human environment*, and have shown somewhat in detail the meaning of this definition.

IV. A COMPARISON OF THIS THESIS WITH OTHER DEFINITIONS

I shall now attempt a fuller description of my position by contrasting it with some representative results of contemporary psychological treatment.

A. First, let me make some further reference to the work of Professor Wright. "The values of religion are all in some sense moral values."¹ True, certainly. But why? If religion is the conservation of socially recognized values, why does it not seek to conserve the vast industrial interests of the land? No values are more fully recognized socially. Yet Dr. Wright's definition does not suggest why these should not today be a matter of concern to religion, nor why the values with which it is concerned should always be in some sense moral. But if, as I have suggested, religion is a social attitude toward the non-human environment, the "self" is always involved; and where the self is involved, the situation is *ipso facto* "in some sense moral." Moreover, whereas ancient industry was very often and very largely a matter of concern to religion, modern industry is not, for the simple reason that the manipulation of the sources of wealth is now a matter of science, inasmuch as non-social or mechanical attitudes have been found by men to be vastly more efficient with reference to such things than the earlier social attitudes were.

Again, "as society advances the general tendency is for religion increasingly to conserve the more important ethical values."²

¹ "A Psychological Definition of Religion," *American Journal of Theology*, XVI (1912), 399.

² *Ibid.*, p. 400.

But why? If my thesis is sound, the reason for the phenomenon here referred to is at once patent. The "self"-consciousness, the moral tone of the group or the individual, at any given stage of development, is the same whether the organism is adjusting itself to the human or to the non-human, and the ethical values which are the more important in one case will also be more important in the other. This statement, i.e., that the "self" is identical in both the human and the non-human situations, of course is not absolutely exact, for the self is ever fluctuating within rather wide limits, shrinking or expanding, waxing or waning in vigor, and this, for the most part, in response to the social environment. There are, however, limits; there is at any period in social evolution, as it were, a "mean temperature" of selfhood or moral tone common to the individual and his group and in large areas of experience. Though, in general, it may be said that the morals of the divine society lag somewhat behind those of the human group whose social imagination has created it (and naturally so, since the constructive imagination cannot work without materials, and those materials must first be produced in the social experience of the group), nevertheless there are more or less definite psychological limits within which the human and the divine codes agree. Herein is the logical explanation of both the truth, and the indefiniteness thereof, in the statement that the tendency is for religion to conserve the more important ethical interests. A selfhood in which, for instance, purity has become integral will demand purity in its divine social environment; and when purity is once established in the divine society, it will react powerfully for the fuller establishment of purity in the human group. Again, the proverbial conservatism of religion is explained by the same facts. For the self must be evolved in the human social *milieu* before it can function in the larger non-human environment. The unseen world is comparatively static because it is changed, not by concrete fact, immediately, but only indirectly by the slow-moving logic of the earthly facts. The construction of a divine world is a slow and arduous process, and is made stable and solid by reason of the very importance of the self's interests which are localized there. Once completed and perfected, it holds the imagination of individuals and of generations in

thrall, and the protests of conscientious iconoclasts make little impression on it. To demand that religion be less conservative is to fail to realize the ponderous proportions of its task. "Rome" may fairly epitomize the general scheme of Western orthodoxy, and "Rome was not built in a day." Various structures in the Eternal City, such as atonement, God, salvation, may be more or less remodeled, with comparative ease (though even here, at close range, the cost in energy and earnestness seems incalculable), but such a wholesale reconstruction as is demanded by the seismic shake-up which modern science and psychology have produced will not be undertaken until all effort to live among the ruins has become too obviously futile, and some consciousness has dawned of the resources of the human nature which builded this city in the past.

Another question which Dr. Wright's essay raises and on which my thesis throws light is that of the relation of religion and aesthetics. For him they are utterly different and distinct. "The differences between aesthetics and religion are so great and their resemblances so superficial that one wonders how the two ever have been confused. The blunder . . . that these features [i.e., music, frescoes, etc.], the merest external adornments and veriest accidents of religion, constituted her heartfelt purpose. . . . The religious endeavor is never an end in itself . . . aesthetic contemplation is interesting on its own account: it is an end in itself."¹ Now, if they are so distinct, how account for their apparent close union? Why is it that some religious persons so vehemently insist that religion is not a matter of aesthetics, while others as earnestly assert that it is? If they are not the same, they are at least inextricably interwoven on abundant evidence. Let me again appeal to my thesis. Religion is an adjustment of the self to its non-human environment. Now in every adjustment there are three logically distinct phases: (1) the initial, "problem" stage, in which emotion, ideation, and volition are all active and preponderant; (2) the smooth working out of the solution, in which emotion dies down into interest, and the actions are automatic and habitual rather than volitional, and the intellectual processes proper are comparatively unnecessary; (3) the appreciative

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 401.

or "economic" stage, in which satisfaction is experienced by means of the successful solution and its actualization. These successive phases may be traced in both physical and social situations, and in any social adjustment whether with the human environment or with the non-human. It extends to large epochal adjustments as well as to the individual's experience. The aesthetic epochs are those in which successful experience tends to symbolize its satisfactions. They are the flowering forth of great cultural or moral or religious achievements. So we have the art of the Greek period, of the Renaissance, of today. Obviously an experience is an end in itself, in degree as it passes into the third, or "economic" phase, of adjustment. Thus in many instances a religious mood is an "end in itself," as some mystical types of devotion so well attest. It is just as impossible to regard the classic Christian mood of "communion with God" as having some ulterior motive as to think of the experience of conjugal felicity or the intercourse of ideal friendship as being a means to an end rather than an end in itself. But so also religious experience may have the general character of the first or problem stage marked by stress and strain and great intellectual and emotional activity, or of the calm but interest-full second stage when the adjustment activity is in process of actualization.

A further quotation from Dr. Wright's essay will help me to make my meaning clearer. "Ages of comparative religious shallowness like the Italian Renaissance have often produced the finest religious art; while, as in the case of the Puritans, movements of deep religious earnestness have sometimes rejected the services of art altogether."¹ My thesis suggests that to call one "shallow" and the other "deep" is to miss the real comparison. The Italian Renaissance is the culmination of a long process of religious adjustment, whereas the Puritan movement is the beginning of another. The first is religious adjustment or experience in the "economic" stage; the latter is religious experience in the "problem" stage. The one very naturally expresses its overripe "satisfaction" or successful accomplishment in the symbols of sacred art. The other in the strenuous period has no sense of ripe accomplishment as yet to symbolize, but has all its energies absorbed in the practical

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 400.

task on hand. To call the one "shallow" and the other "deep" is as inadequate as to say that the relaxed mood at the end of a hard day's work, when one goes over the day's deeds in reverie or in conversation, is "shallow" as compared with the sweat and dust of the hours of toil. They are both normal phases of the total situation. Similarly, periods of moral reconstruction have their strongly contrasting "problem" and "economic" phases. We fight the great fight of slavery and years later express our appreciation of the importance and success of the task in sculpture, painting, and architecture. We undertake vast industrial problems and soon the sense of having made a beginning at least finds expression in a great mural decoration. Important discoveries are lived over again in pageantry. So the artistic impulse is a normal phase of moral as well as of religious evolution. And in passing, it might be pointed out how the individual aesthetic experience may be regarded as religious. The aesthetic impulse in the individual regarded from the organic functional standpoint is simply the result of racial experience incorporated in the nervous structure of the individual organism. The sense of beauty is organic and instinctive, builded up by many generations. It may, of course, be liberated by education. (The matter of art as a technique of symbolization is aside from the psychological understanding of the aesthetic nature.) But what in its simplest terms is the appreciative attitude which many people instinctively take toward a "beautiful" landscape but the hereditary responsiveness of the organism toward favorable environment? This is of the physical type. The appreciation of a beautiful or noble face is an aesthetic impulse of the moral type. The sensitive soul, however, may gaze upon a beautiful landscape with emotions that he himself cannot define but as religious. What has happened to make the aesthetic moment religious? A sense of selfhood has arisen as he gazes. It is no longer *merely* aesthetic, because the organism is so aroused as to make a total, that is to say, a social reaction, over against the non-human. The aesthetic feeling blends into the religious. Such an aesthetico-religious experience is typically expressed in the lines:

The clouds that gather round the setting sun,
Do take a sober coloring from the eye
That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality.

B. Let us next consider Irving King's *Development of Religion*.¹ This author thus defines religion: "The religious consciousness is a special development of the valuational attitudes² a special development of the valuational type of consciousness."³ It is obvious that such a statement involves the necessity, first, of distinguishing between the practical and the valuational attitudes; and secondly, that of differentiating that special type of the latter which is religious from other types of the valuational consciousness.

Now the primary criticism to be made upon Professor King's position is that his distinction between "practical" and "valuational" is entirely artificial. For the larger part of the valuational moments of consciousness are as truly practical as anything else. Indeed, it may fairly be said that the more "appreciation" we have of a situation of danger or object of desire the more intensely "practical" it *ipso facto* is.

The trouble with this term "valuational" or "appreciative" is that it may properly refer to three different aspects of activity. In the first place, any action in its third or "economic" stage is practically a mood of appreciation.⁴ In the second place, the pleasure-pain tone which accompanies most, if not all, sensations is the organism's instinctive "evaluation" of its stimuli. When this affective tone is very intense, we may sometimes describe it as "appreciative"; for example, one "appreciates" a good square meal when very hungry, one "appreciates" a fire on the hearth after being out in the cold damp night, one "appreciates" a danger when its perilous aspects have fully aroused the instinct of self-preservation. In the third place, the emergence of "self"-consciousness renders any attitude appreciative or valuational in proportion as the "self" is highly organized and explicit. This is of course the most important of the three factors, and it is this which is the real explanation of the importance of social life in developing a sense of "values" on which King so constantly insists. "The sense of value itself is so thoroughly bound up with social activities that it may almost be called a social category."⁵ But he does not see that the most important result of social

¹ *The Development of Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1910.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁴ See discussion above, p. 247.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 64.

intercourse is the creation of self-consciousness, and hence the real psychological connection between the social *milieu* and the sense of value is lost. It is indeed true that "the particular function of the social element is in giving stability and depth to the values brought to consciousness through the rise of intermediate activities,"¹ but do not these values acquire "stability and depth" just because they become the values not merely of physical organisms but of social "selves?"

Professor King himself seems to admit that he has not made a very successful differentiation. For instance, he says: "It [religion] originates, it is true, to a certain extent in the practical life of a people. . . . It is true that the feelings of appreciation thus gained may be carried over and used in very pressing and practical situations. . . . Prayer and sacrifice, although in a way practical expedients, are also just as truly expressions of an appreciative disposition on the part of the worshiper. . . . One mode of reaction will in many cases be sure to merge with the other. . . ."² The artificiality of this distinction between practical and valuational attitudes, as such, accounts for some of the strained positions he is compelled to assume. For instance: "Were religion a practical expedient, it would have died out, as magic is doing with the growing sense of inutility."³ But religions do die out, with the growing sense of their inutility. Religion, in the general sense of what the various religions have tried to do, does not die out, and it is equally true that what magic tried to do does not die out. King himself calls magic primitive man's science, and the continuity of the general function which magic attempted is just as real as and no more real than the continuity of the general function of mankind which we call religion.

Passing now to the second task of differentiation which King's position involves, how does he distinguish between those valuational attitudes which are religious and those which are not religious? In general, it seems to be simply a question of the degree of social importance. "As certain of these values stand out and acquire great prominence in the social consciousness, they become in so far

¹ *The Development of Religion*, p. 70.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 172 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

religious, and the activities which were before only practical expedients are now transformed into religious ceremonials.”¹ Or to put it otherwise, religious values are ultimate values. “That the social organization is practically the *ne plus ultra* of primitive man’s life is a most important point for the development of religious values out of those of less degree. . . . Psychologically the values of the group are not only higher than those of the individual, they are genuinely ultimate and universal. This is our argument in a nutshell.”² As for modern man, “the religious attitude may be said to be the consciousness of the value of action in terms of its ultimate organization.”³ In a word, since religion is “the appreciation of the more permanent and far-reaching values,”⁴ the more permanent and far-reaching the values at stake the more are they to be considered religious. But surely this does not by any means clearly distinguish between religious and moral or scientific values. The very case he cites of the Greenland Eskimo seems to me to expose this.

The social assemblies of the Greenland Eskimos are good examples of “accessory” activities, and their social and aesthetic value is so great and their function as an institution of social control is so evident that they may be considered as religious rites. The Eskimos have, on the other hand, many habits connected with their hunting, but these depend so clearly upon individual skill and painstaking practice and the conditions under which they are called forth are so acute, that they continue almost of necessity quite definably “practical,” and hence non-religious.⁵

Now a technique for social control can hardly be said to be of “more permanent and far-reaching” value than a technique for obtaining food, nor can it be said to be less “practical,” so that neither King’s primary nor secondary criterion for religion seems to be operative in this case. Indeed, the distinction in this case is based upon other considerations than those suggested in the criterion of “ultimacy.” “Their social and aesthetic value is so great . . . that they may be considered religious rites.” This seems to suggest that religious and aesthetic are very much the same thing, a question to which more explicit attention will be

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 101.

given shortly. Meanwhile it should be noted that other criteria are also introduced as well as this aesthetic quality. "That these are ostensibly religious ceremonies is indicated by their definitely prescribed character and by the various symbolic acts which are intermingled with the more useful expedients."¹ Surely fixity of form and symbolical representation are very different from ultimacy of value as a touchstone for the religious quality of any activity. And why might not a purely moral value find expression in a "definitely prescribed" or "symbolic" activity? It is indeed just the powerlessness of this definition and the somewhat similar one of Professor Ames to reveal any logical distinction between religion and morality that I find most objectionable. "Morality, as its etymology suggests, refers also to the customary, and on this ground we may argue with much assurance for the view that primitive religion and primitive morals are but two sides of the same thing."² But if the distinguishing mark of religious values is their ultimacy, how does this separate religion from the aesthetic? It was suggested above that, in the quotation referred to, they seemed to be practically identical. The question of the difference between them King considers on p. 84:

In general it may be said that the difference between them is one of relationships rather than of intrinsic content. Thus the peculiarity of aesthetic values is that they are detached or isolated from the problems of life, while values of the religious type are expressions of these problems in their most ultimate form. But, in any case, there can be no question as to the close connection of the two attitudes, and in all probability they are always intermingled.

King's theory seems to afford no clear differentiation between religion and morality, or between religion and aesthetics.

Before leaving King's treatment of the subject, I wish to illustrate further my own conception of religion by using one of the important instances which he cites in support of his. Referring to the dances of the bushmen, he says:

We pass from these activities in which the sportive element seems to predominate to others of a more religious character. . . . There was certainly no sharply dividing line between the religious and the non-religious in these cases. . . . Their ceremonial dances were specializations from a perfectly

¹ *The Development of Religion*, p. 105.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

spontaneous manifestation of primitive joyousness. . . . Among other primitive peoples these same activities came in many instances to express to their doers some sort of ultimate worthfulness. That is, the meaning of their lives, as far as they were able to conceive it, was in some way bound up with the moon, with the sun, with certain natural phenomena, such as thunder storms, or with food itself; and as a consequence, the activities which had gradually crystallized about these intense centres of interest, since they were literally the expression of the relation of the people to the things, and were the only means by which they could think of that relation—these activities, we repeat, became religious ceremonials in the true sense.¹

In this quotation the two essential principles which I suggested in my definition are very distinctly though not explicitly referred to, namely, the element of self-consciousness, or feeling of self-worth, and the non-human environment. “The meaning of their lives was in some way bound up with the moon,” etc., and hence “these activities, since they were literally the expression of the relation of the people to these things . . . became religious ceremonies in the true sense.” In the evolution of the religious dance, out of the mere overflow of animal spirits in the moonlight, the point at which religion appears is the point at which moral consciousness or the sense of selfhood or “the meaning of their lives” emerges.

C. Another conception of religion which I wish to examine is in Ames's *Psychology of Religious Experience*.² Professor Ames thus defines religion: “The social consciousness in its most intimate and vital phases is identical with religion.”³ He defends this position on several grounds. First, the traditional distinction between morality and religion was based upon one or other of several dualisms which today have been entirely retired, such as that of the natural and the supernatural which science destroys, or that of the faculties which modern psychology destroys, or even that of the conscious and the subconscious which is also doomed.⁴ Dr. Ames concludes: “Without the definite assumption of this dualism, the line between morality and religion becomes obscure and tends to vanish completely.” Now my contention is that while the distinction, which is basic to my definition, between the human and

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 111, 112.

² *The Psychology of Religious Experience*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 377.

⁴ See pp. 286, 290.

non-human environment is not a substitute for any of the dualisms referred to, it is a distinction so natural and so important as to be worthy of the prominence I give it and is the real ground of the distinction between religion and morality to which tradition has so tenaciously and instinctively clung.

Dr. Ames's second argument is that as we study morality and religion genetically we find that in their beginnings there is no such clear-cut distinction, and so we may conclude that the distinction is due to our habits of thought and not to the nature of the case. "What have come to be known as the religious observances of primitive peoples were concerned with all the vital interests of the social group. . . . It is difficult and in fact quite impossible to distinguish sharply and finally in primitive life between law, morality, art, and religion."¹ But granted that religion and morality are not clearly separate in their primitive beginnings; granted further that they are continually interfusing even in the most highly developed forms; this is no more than may be said of any motives in human life, for all our interests are inextricably interwoven. Their logical differentiation, however, is of great practical importance for purposes of control and enrichment. My criticism of Professor Ames's treatment is that he fails to note that among the various ritualistic or ceremonial activities of a primitive group which he classes together as religious rites, some are obviously referable to interests which lie within the group itself, and others to interests which involve the relation of the group to its non-human environment. As chief occasions of ceremonial rites Dr. Ames gives the following:² (1) phenomena in nature, such as seedtime and harvest, the opening of the fishing and hunting seasons, etc.; (2) birth, initiation, and marriage; (3) death and burial; (4) war and treatment of strangers.

Now it is quite true that the most obvious quality which such varied rites have in common is the emotional enhancement of common vital interests. But I believe they may be separated into two classes without the least arbitrariness. For instance, the celebration of natural phenomena and that of the dangers and success of war refer respectively to the non-human and the human environ-

¹ *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 336.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 73 ff.

ment. Again, death and birth, while having obviously a social reference, nevertheless are outstanding examples of the vital dependence of the group upon the forces of nature, whereas initiation and marriage embody interests which fall almost entirely within the boundaries of the group. The double reference of death and birth does not discount the importance of the distinction which I am trying to emphasize. One and the same event may have *both* moral and religious aspects. Dr. Ames gives as a further defense of the position that morality and religion are practically identical, the fact that "religion in the minds of its best representatives at the present time consciously and frankly accepts as its highest conception the ideal of a kingdom or brotherhood of moral agents co-operative for the attainment of further moral ends."¹ But compare this "kingdom" ideal with a non-religious utopia, such as socialism. Granted an equal moral earnestness in both, why is the one consciously religious and the other consciously and avowedly non-religious? The one believes itself to be *en rapport* with an extra-human power with which it is co-operating. The other explicitly depends upon its own efforts, its program limits itself strictly to social human forces. The first is religious because, while profoundly moral, it is fundamentally an adjustment to a non-human environing power; the other is moral, and merely moral, because its whole attention and interest centers in the social human situation. To be sure, there are many indications of socialism taking on a religious quality, but these very instances only serve the more clearly to illustrate my thesis. Such religious brands of socialism are those in which the thinker's horizon broadens to take in "nature" or "evolution" or some other more or less inclusive non-human prospect, with which his moral ideals make some sort of adjustment.²

Again, from the results of Starbuck's investigation, Dr. Ames quotes the fact that "among the things absolutely essential, the *sine qua non* of religion, conduct was most frequently mentioned."³

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 286.

² For instance, one cannot but feel the religious tone of the chapter on "The Good Will" in H. G. Wells's *New Worlds for Old*.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 287.

Here again the connection between moral conduct and religion should be obvious. In the higher phases of experience, "social attitudes" because organized and voluntary and not merely instinctive and accidental are moral attitudes. The organism making the religious adjustment is a moral organism, it can give no account of itself without employing ethical categories. A religious experience that has not conduct or moral behavior as an integral part of itself is not from this standpoint thinkable.

It seems to me that the logic of Dr. Ames's position leads to untenable conclusions. The enthusiasm of a political campaign and that of a missionary mass meeting may have very much in common, yet there is surely some deep disparity. A torch light procession is not necessarily a religious ceremony, nor is the final game in a baseball world series, though it seems to me that if we adopted Dr. Ames's criterion of the religious quality we should be forced to consider them as such.

Take the statement that "all moral ideals are religious in the degree to which they are the expression of great vital interests of society."¹ Reform of the currency and tariff revision are great vital interests of society, but no intensity of discussion can make these really religious problems. The high cost of living is a moral or economic and not a religious problem today, whereas the food supply was among primitive men the very impetus to religion; and the reason is that we are concerned with human manipulations of the food supply or with the sources of food in a mechanical or scientific manner, so the problem is partly moral and partly scientific. We are not forced normally to take a social attitude toward the source of the food supply itself, though a great famine would probably inspire in a large part of the population a strictly social attitude toward nature, and many would be likely to pray for rain. I believe we may conclude that it is not merely the greatness of the social interests which are at stake, but the attitude which we take toward the non-human environment with which those interests so closely bind us that determines the religiousness of our ideals. If that attitude is social, and in so far as it is social, we are religious.

¹ *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 286.

Furthermore, if the "social consciousness in its most intimate and vital phases is identical with religion," would it not seem that an intensely individualistic religious experience is a contradiction in terms? Of course, there can be no hard-and-fast distinction between the individual consciousness and the social consciousness, yet there can be no such thing as personality without the distinction. But if the primitive man is religious in proportion as his individuality is lost and swallowed up in the group consciousness as it is in these great ceremonial experiences, and if this is indeed the logic of religion, how can we possibly account for the religious experience that is profoundly antipathetic to the dominant group consciousness and is relatively of an extremely individualistic type? Is not the religious genius, on these grounds, an anomaly? "The most important feature of these ceremonials, that which distinguishes them and makes them religious, is the public and social character. . . . The social side is dominant and controlling. . . . It would be no exaggeration to say that all ceremonials in which the whole group operates with keen emotional interest are religious."¹ To be sure, it is a long way from the dance of a tribe of Australian blacks to the meditations of a highly educated white; but it is the logic of the situation we are concerned with, and if it is the social emotional quality which is the religious differentia, how can individualism be religious? But if the conception of religion be adopted which I have suggested in this paper, is not the religious genius logically normal? It is just the dominant self which emerges in the social *milieu* which is apt, when confronting the non-human environment, to react more forcefully, with personal variation, toward it and so to initiate changes in the reactions of the whole group toward the non-human. So also may be explained, and indeed defended, the insistence which the evangelical Protestant tradition has always maintained, that religion is, in the last analysis, a personal affair.

James in his *The Varieties of Religious Experience* bases his study of religion not upon rites, cult, or institutions, but upon the subjective or individualistic side of religious experience; not upon the primitive, but upon the modern type of man. He holds

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

that "personal religion should still seem the primordial thing."¹ He draws his conclusions from a study of "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine."² His conclusion is that "religion is a man's total reaction upon life."³ And by total reaction he means this: "Total reactions . . . to get at them you must go behind the foreground of existence and reach down to that curious sense of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence, intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious, which in some degree everyone possesses."⁴ Now to find the whole residual cosmos, a "presence" "intimate or alien," "lovable or odious"—certainly this is to take a social attitude to the non-human environment. But within the limits of this definition we may find "the light irony of Voltaire and Renan, the pessimism of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche," and James admits that these are logically religious, though there seems some incongruity in calling them such. "For common men religion . . . signifies always a serious state of mind"; and pessimists lack "the purgatorial note which religious sadness gives forth." Now these exceptions are quite in keeping logically with the definition I have suggested. Religion is a vital adjustment, and the more successful and satisfactory it is the more truly may it be called religious. As James says, "the boundaries are always misty and it is everywhere a question of amount and degree."⁵ James feels that religion must have warmth and positiveness:

Morality pure and simple accepts the law of the whole which it finds reigning, so far as to acknowledge and obey it, but it may obey it with the heaviest and coldest heart and never cease to feel it as a yoke. But for religion in its strong and fully developed manifestations, the service of the highest is never felt as a yoke. Dull submission is left far behind and a mood of welcome . . . has taken its place.⁶

Here again I submit it is not really a question of morality and religion, but of a more or less successful and complete adjustment on the part of a moral organism to an inescapable non-human

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

environment. To "accept the universe in the drab discolored way of stoic resignation to necessity" is to indicate that the self is baffled or frustrated in its effort at adjustment. James admits that morality in this sense and the more successful buoyant type of experience are "both religious in the wider sense."

V. THE VALUE OF THE DEFINITION GIVEN IN THIS DISCUSSION

What of the value of the definition which I have proposed? If it is a "concrete universal," it should serve as a guide to further experience. It should clarify the conditions of any real progress. I believe that it simplifies our religious problem in the following ways:

1. It suggests for the individual the inevitable necessity of some sort of religious experience. The self can never free itself from its encompassing cosmos. For the development of morality enhances the vividness of self-consciousness, and the expansion of science only shifts, never annihilates, the "borderland dim" where "control" merges into mystery.
2. It reveals the underlying harmony of effort in the most divergent religious views and practices. The most primitive savage and the most profound savant are forced to attempt one and the same task, namely, an adjustment of the "self" to the non-human environment. This should change the war of creeds into a co-operative comparison of the relative efficiency of various instruments wherewith the common task is undertaken.
3. It removes the "bottomless subjectivity" which contemporary psychology appears to bring into the religious sphere. For any object of faith is seen in this light to be, not merely the "symbol" of some "value" (which "value" largely evaporates when once its symbol is recognized as mere symbol), but rather an instrument whereby an abiding environment is interpreted or appropriated or controlled. The reality of this environment abides, and the necessary task of adjustment abides. Though the instrument be outworn, even though it be the greatest of all which the past has fashioned, all the validity formerly felt to inhere in that instrument still remains in the vast and vital task for which that tool was forged and in which it was so long and so well used.

The conditions of the task are greatly changed. The task in its ultimate simplicity and necessity remains.

4. It reveals the relation between science and religion. This cannot possibly be anything but some sort of supplementation. The social and the non-social attitudes toward the non-human are not contradictory. Physical, mechanical manipulation and control of the environment only serve to enlarge that environment, and beyond the scope of achieved mechanical control forever reaches the realm of the larger organic attitude, the social attitude. In science meanings are abstracted from departments of experience for the sake of more adequate control, and this control serves in turn to produce richer meanings. A mechanical interpretation of Nature is not an end in itself. It is but a means of solving problems, and problems solved make for fuller and richer experience.

It has been the purpose of this essay to indicate the underlying organic relation between the scientific mood and the religious mood. It is not merely that they are alternating tempers, both compelling in their respective ways. They are not merely different. *Why* are they different? *Why* do they alternate? *Why must* they alternate? And what is gained by their alternation? And what is their respective value to the vitality of the human spirit? What are their relative functions in the organism which they both serve? Such questions as these are as important for an understanding of human life as a vast vital complex as are the matters of anatomy and physiology for an understanding of the individual human body. It is believed that the analysis suggested in this discussion may prove valuable in seeking an answer to such questions.

APPENDIX A. ANIMISM

The general viewpoint of this paper should make it clear that it is a mistake to think of animism as characteristic only of primitive peoples. There are animistic impulses in the most sophisticated of us. It is not necessary explicitly to personify a natural object to be animistic. Indeed, complete personification is but the completely organized and consciously maintained stage of the social attitude. It is less correct to say that such vaguely personal feelings and attitudes which modern grownups often experience toward nature and natural objects are survivals of animism than to recognize that in the lower races and in children the preponderance of social attitudes as compared with mechanical

or non-social attitudes is simply the positive aspect of their lack of corrective experience and mechanical control. The word animism is simply a positive characterization of the tardiness with which the non-social aspects of environment are differentiated from the social. The essential difference between the physical and the social objects in the child's home is the method of control required. The physical object is normally passive and requires only manipulation. The social object is normally active and requires constant readjustment in a ceaseless series of gestures or attitudes or social stimuli or responses. Whenever a physical object behaves in an unexpected or abnormal manner; when, in other words, the customary manipulations or non-social adjustments fail of control, the process of sophistication is arrested, and the social responses or attitudes are elicited. The child is "angry" with the door that slams against him. The savage is "afraid" of the roaring river or the queer-looking rock or the poisonous food. Control breaks down. Habitual adjustments are ineffective. Mere manipulation is inadequate and the whole organism is thrown on the alert. The *dangerous* thing is an "enemy." In the most primitive stages the whole surrounding world of trees, streams, clouds, rocks, storms, winds, etc., being so largely beyond control, evokes the social attitudes because the whole organism is on the *qui vive*. This general social attitude toward nature or the physical environment is animism. As methods of control develop in the race or in the child, the environment becomes differentiated into the social and the non-social. (The question of the differentiation of the social into "human" and "animal" will be referred to in Appendix B.)

Now if animism be understood as the prevalence among primitive peoples of these instinctive social attitudes toward the phenomena of nature, the question whether it is a form of religion will, in the light of my analysis, find a simple answer. Animism is the general field within which develop those more vital adjustments which we call religious ceremonies and beliefs. To try to determine at what stage animism is pre-religious or religion is pre-animistic is an arbitrary proceeding. Logically animism and religion are identical. Practically we are inclined to restrict the name "religion" to the more vital or important examples of the animistic attitude.

APPENDIX B. TOTEMISM

What is the relation between a religious totemism and a possible pre-religious totemism? Now if religion is a social attitude toward the non-human, it may be urged that there never was a time when men were not religious, since the social attitudes are primary. But the beginning of religion will be in the rise of the differentiation between the human and the non-human. "In a pure system of totemism the human and the non-human members . . . are not distinguished" (Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, p. 76). "Every totem clan traverses what seems to us the natural boundary between man and other creatures, and brings a department of nature inside a subdivision of

society. . . . It is only when the dim consciousness of a distinction has dawned and the nature and behavior of (say) an emu begin to appear in some degree different from and independent of the nature and behavior of emu-men that the first step is taken on the road to religion" (Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 91). "This crisis closes the first or pure stage of magic—the birthplace of what is currently called religion" (*ibid.*, p. 92). "In this primary stage we find a pre-religious condition of mankind; for in the definition of religion we include some representation of a power that is 'not ourselves.'" Logically the religious quality emerges, in social attitudes toward the non-human, with the dawn of a consciousness of its non-humanness; or, to put it otherwise, with the dawn of a human self-consciousness. Cornford, however, confuses religion and morality by failing to analyze into its human and non-human elements that "power not ourselves," a consciousness of which he accepts as the test for the presence of religion. "The collective consciousness is super-individual. It resides of course in the group. . . . In so far as this power is not myself and greater than myself, it is a moral or restraining force which can and does impose upon the individual the necessity of observing the uniform behavior of the group. With the first dawn of a distinction between myself and the social consciousness comes the first shadowy representation which may be called religious or moral" (*op. cit.*, p. 81). Is it not much simpler and more satisfactory to say that in so far as that "power not myself" which controls me is the will or custom of my group, the control is nascently moral, and in so far as that "power not myself," even though mediated by group custom, is really a non-human or superhuman force or principle, the control is of the religious sort?

APPENDIX C. MAGIC

There has been much discussion as to whether magic and religion are identical or different. Ames and King hold that magic is of two sorts, group magic and individual magic, and that the former is religious and the latter non-religious. "Not all magic but only such as belongs to group activities enter into religion" (Ames, *Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 110). "Public magic to all intents and purposes is identical with primitive religion. On the other hand, when religion becomes subservient to anti-social or merely private ends, it is scarcely to be distinguished from sorcery" (King, *Development of Religion*, p. 195). King thus defines sorcery: "The sorcerer is one who deals privately with secret powers, or at least with means not generally known to the group, and the object is almost always private gain or personal vengeance" (*ibid.*, p. 191).

Let me make some further quotations from King, on the basis of which I wish to offer a criticism which will make my own position clearer.

"If these practices [i.e., "the great mass of unreflective spontaneous reactions of the psycho-physical organism"] had chanced to be more closely associated with the evolution of tribal consciousness and tribal interests, they

might have furnished the nuclei of rituals and definite religious ideas. If they had been more closely connected with lines of individual interest, so as to furnish a technique available to the individual for carrying out his personal desires, they would have formed the basis of magic" (*ibid.*, p. 189). "Magic is simply primitive man's science, and there is nothing to hinder the tribe from availing itself of the scientific knowledge in the hands of its members. Many social groups may and have adopted magical practices. Magic furnishes the community with a technique for doing many simple things. . . . In communities of loose organization magic might be so thoroughly taken up by the group as to be indistinguishable from religion." Among the North American Indians, in general, "medicine practices cannot be differentiated from religious rites and observances" (*op. cit.*, p. 203).

As to sorcery: "When a man feels he is capable of becoming a sorcerer, he ventures forth quite alone, until he comes to the mouth of the cave where the spirits dwell" (*ibid.*, p. 198). "Having been instructed by the sorcerer in the mysteries of the Great Mother, the master of divination turns him out into the bush all by himself to the contemplation of the mysteries that lie all about him" (*ibid.*, p. 198).

Now if the criterion for the religious quality is the "public and social" character of any activity, and if magic is "public and social," of course it is, *ipso facto*, religion. But if we should have reason to feel that private magic also may have a religious aspect, what becomes of the "public and social" criterion? Of course, we may argue in a circle and see religion where we are predisposed to look for it. But I must confess that if I were taking a course in sorcery—standing alone in the mouth of the cave where the spirits dwell—or contemplating the mysteries of the Great Mother all about me, if my experience in such a situation would not be distinctly religious, then I do not know what the "feel" of religion is. Has not many a victim been burnt as a sorcerer, only to be recognized by succeeding generations as a martyr to some religious faith? Would it not be more adequate to say that the practitioner of a private magic may be a sorcerer so far as the tribe is concerned, a prophet or priest, a religious person, so far as his relationship with the non-human is concerned? And if his "sorceries," as in the case of North American Indians, should prove beneficial rather than detrimental to the tribe, will he not be recognized as a prophet by his tribe, and no longer called a sorcerer? We have known enough of non-social and even anti-social religion in modern times to enable us to avoid confusing a lack of public spirit with a lack of religion. And when the magic is used by the group, is not its religious quality still due to the same factor as made it religious in the prophet-sorcerer? Moreover, this public magic may be called primitive man's science, if we are thinking merely of the practical results achieved or attempted. Indeed, both public and private magic may be considered as non-religious—a mere customary use of certain formulae or performance of specific acts, out of which the original religious quality has disappeared by sheer weight of habit or absence of cause for emotional interest.

Indeed, many magical acts may never have had any religious origin, being simply the repetition of chance "lucky" movements or methods. When, however, by reason of enhanced emotional quality the group consciousness becomes aware of some other-than-the-group force or power, the magical ceremonies take on the religious complexion.

APPENDIX D. MYSTICISM

The union of functional and social psychology which forms the background of my thesis should serve to indicate the normal place of mysticism in religious experience. The primacy of instinctive organic responses, their organization into habit, the production by habit of cerebral processes which we call ideation, the rise of emotion as the accompaniment of the inhibition of action by reason of conflicting tendencies to act, and the solution of the conflict by means of intellectual or ideational processes or reconstructions, the primary preponderance of the social instinctive responses, the tendency of the organism when on the *qui vive*, when subject to intense or vague stimulation, to exhibit the social attitudes, these briefly are facts which underlie the following statement of the place of mysticism in religion.

Pratt, in his *Psychology of Religious Belief*, contrasts three types of religion: that of credulity, that of rationalism, that of feeling. He can, of course, account for the breakdown of the first two, but believes that the third is indispensable and inevitable. He claims that "the whole man should be trusted" (*ibid.*, p. 27), and the "whole man" will continue to experience "the religion of feeling," in which the "belief in God is a vital rather than a theoretical matter" (*ibid.*, p. 293). Now if my presuppositions are correct, the "whole man" will react to his environment instinctively, correcting his actions by means of the ideational equipment, which he gradually develops and elaborates; in degree as his actions are inhibited by conflicting suggestions, emotion or feeling is aroused; as successful reactions are established in habit, the accompanying ideas are fixed and feeling dies away; as the habitual reactions are rendered futile by some new situation, the ideational accompaniments of these habitual reactions are rendered useless or "false"; the following period of stress and strain is comparatively meagre in ideas of any settled quality and rich in the emotional element; the less definite adjustments of the new situation will be preponderantly social in their type. In situations of the less definite, less habitual sort, obviously the inarticulate emotional responses will preponderate, and this is the mystical phase of religion. In the more finished, elaborated adjustments the ideational or intellectual element is prominent, and the feeling factor is relatively small. Furthermore, the vague emotional phase will be normally of the *social* instinctive type, so that in the mystical mood we are aware of a "presence" of some vague sort. This inarticulate awareness tends, of course, to become articulate; the mystical mood will probably leave a creedal deposit of some sort; fervor, to the great disgust of the prophet, tends

in the average man to lose itself in a habit or a formula. So Pratt is quite correct in saying that "the belief in God of the religion of feeling is a vital rather than a theoretical matter"—it is a non-intellectual social response to a vaguely comprehended situation, a social attitude which can find no better explanation of itself than to say that it is aware of a "Presence" in the world, in Nature. But he fails entirely to grasp the relative significance of the three types of religion when he puts them in the order of credulity, rationalism, feeling. It would be more accurate to say, that in every religious experience there are normally three stages: first, the feeling stage, in which adjustment has not yet achieved explicit expression; secondly, credulity, in which the ideational accompaniments of adjustment are comparatively crude and uncriticized, relative to the more immediate situation rather than to the larger implications and connections thereof; thirdly, the rational or even rationalistic, in which the ideational factors tend to become more and more elaborate, the situation so familiar as to fail to elicit any great emotional interest, decidedly *other* than what we mean by a "vital" situation. Our present religious situation, to be sure, is one which seems to suggest that hereafter we can have only the "feeling" type of religion, for the new universe in which modern men are trying to make themselves at home is so vast, so many new factors are being revealed almost every day; in a word, the problem situation is so novel, so varied, so boundless, that a well-articulated, compact, fully elaborated ideational adjustment seems almost beyond the range of possibility. Mysticism seems to promise the fullest satisfaction we dare hope for. We can but trust "the whole man" in his deeper, more instinctive, more emotional parts. But the whole man is a thinking organism, and can hardly be expected to be forever content with mere feeling. Mysticism is sure sooner or later to develop a bony framework of ideas. The demands of modern life upon "the whole man" are so great that both endo- and exo-skeletons are imperatively needed if progress is to be achieved in any definable direction, and if we are not to suffer overlong from the buffettings of uncertainty.

The mysticism of the traditional type is accounted for on the same grounds. The stimulation of unusually sensitive personalities by the tremendous social or moral appeal of the Christian divine society, in conjunction with the vagueness and uncertainty which an intangible reality necessarily entailed, logically produced a stress-and-strain situation in which feeling preponderates and clear ideas are impossible. This mood is naturally accentuated by inhibition of action which the saint's withdrawal necessarily produced. In a word, it is a situation in which there is a tremendous stimulation to the social nature, but in which no action is either possible or called for, and hence the floods of feeling and ecstatic experience, and the intense sense of a "Presence."